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Abstract
We investigate the role of permanent and transitory shocks for ﬁrms and aggregate dynamics.
We directly model the dynamics of a large panel of ﬁrms. We ﬁnd that permanent shocks to
productivity and permanent shifts in the composition of output explain at least 4/5 of ﬁrms
dynamics. However, these permanent shocks are almost uncorrelated across ﬁrms, and are
therefore less relevant for aggregate dynamics. Transitory shocks, on the other hand, are not
very important at the ﬁrm level. However, because they are signiﬁcantly correlated across ﬁrms
they account for most of the volatility of aggregate hours and output. We also show that not
using ﬁrm level data leads to misidentiﬁcation of the permanent shocks. Finally, we try to
make some progress on the interpretation of the shocks. We show that monetary shocks cause
only transitory dynamics, while oil shocks also have permanent eﬀects. We ﬁnd that public
spending shocks have a positive transitory eﬀect, and that tax shocks have a negative transitory
eﬀect. We also ﬁnd some evidence suggesting that both spending and tax shocks have negative
permanent eﬀects.
Key Words: Technology Shocks, Business Cycles, Long-run Restrictions
JEL Classiﬁcation: E2, E3
∗This paper is an updated version of ”Industry and Aggregate Dynamics”.
11I n t r o d u c t i o n
We investigate the nature of aggregate shocks. Empirical macroeconomic research has mainly ap-
proached this question using aggregate time series. Yet, the conditions that guarantee the existence
of a meaningful aggregate production function are unlikely to be satisﬁed in practice. As a result,
shocks identiﬁed directly from aggregate data are, at best, hard to interpret. We tackle this problem
by directly modeling the dynamics of two panels: one containing 33 sectors covering the entire US
private economy, and the other containing 526 large, publicly traded, ﬁrms.
We assume that ﬁrms’ dynamics are driven by three diﬀerent shocks. First, there are permanent,
stochastic technological improvements. Second, there are changes in the composition of aggregate
output and in consumers’ tastes that translate into changes in the relative demands for the diﬀerent
ﬁrms. Finally, there are transitory shocks. We identify each shock using long run restrictions in a
structural VAR: transitory shocks cannot have permanent eﬀects on either the productivity or the
relative size of ﬁrms, while composition shocks cannot have a permanent eﬀect of the productivity
of ﬁrms.
For each ﬁrm, we recover the three time series of structural shocks. We then investigate the
relative importance of each shock for ﬁrms and aggregate dynamics. We ﬁnd that permanent tech-
nology shocks and permanent changes in the composition of output explain more than 4
5 of ﬁrms
dynamics. However, we also ﬁnd that these shocks are almost uncorrelated across ﬁrms. By con-
trast, the correlation of transitory shocks lies between 23.6% and 27.7%, depending on the speciﬁcs
of the model we use. In other words, we show the existence of an aggregate transitory shock. This
shock explains most of the variations in output and labor input for the US economy, despite being
the least important shock at the ﬁrm level.
There have been many previous attempts to identify the exogenous sources of the business cycle.
One strand of literature follows the lead of Kydland and Prescott (1982) by specifying a dynamic
equilibrium model, choosing the primitive source(s) of the ﬂuctuation and deﬁning shock(s) as resid-
ual(s)1 from the equations of the model. Recent papers on this topic (Smets and Wouters, 2003 and
Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan, 2004) have found that shocks that changes to the consumption-leisure
margin explain most of the ﬂuctuations2. Another strand of literature has adopted the long run
1For instance Prescott (1986) arrives at an estimate of the fraction of output variability that can be attributed
to technology shocks using actual Solow residuals to estimate the variance and serial correlation of the underlying
technology shocks. Feeding shocks with these properties into a calibrated real-business-cycle model resulted in output
variability that was between 50 and 75 percent of actual variability
2Hall (1997) emphasizes that a large fraction of business cycle ﬂuctuations seems to be accounted for by changes
in the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure. Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2004) label this
variable ”labor wedge.” Smets and Wouters (2003) study a dynamic general equilibrium model with nominal rigidities
and allow for various types of shocks, including productivity shocks, preference shocks and mark-up shocks. They
found that a sizeable fraction of output volatility is due to preference shocks that induce changes on the consumption-
leisure margin.
2identiﬁcation strategy of Blanchard and Quah (1989), and Shapiro and Watson (1988). Gali (1999)
uses a bivariate VAR with the growth rate of labor productivity and hours worked, and distinguishes
shocks that aﬀect labor productivity in the long run from those that do not. The main ﬁndings ac-
cording to this approach are that the permanent shock has a negative short run eﬀect on hours,
and that it explains very little of the business cycle3. Some recent studies (Francis (2001), Chang
and Hong (2003)) have used industry data to investigate the robustness of the ﬁrst ﬁnding. Gali
and Rabanal (2004) give a comprehensive survey of the existing literature, while Chari, Kehoe and
McGrattan (2004b) present a critique.
We make three contributions to the literature. First, we introduce the composition shocks and
show that they are very important sources of ﬁrm level dynamics. Second, we show that even at the
industry level, aggregation poses problems for the identiﬁcation of the permanent shocks. We show
that the permanent shock identiﬁed from industry level data contains some transitory component
and that it is correlated with monetary shocks. By contrast, our ﬁrm level permanent shock is not
correlated with monetary shocks. We ﬁnd that public spending shocks have a positive transitory
eﬀect, and that tax shocks have a negative transitory eﬀect. We also ﬁnd some evidence suggesting
that both spending and tax shocks have negative permanent eﬀects. Finally, to the best of our
knowledge, we are the ﬁrst to investigate the co-movements of permanent and transitory shocks
at the ﬁrm level. A similar exercise was performed by Kiley (1996) using industry data for the
manufacturing sector.
In section 2, we present a simple, neoclassical model of an economy with sectorial shocks, which
we use to derive our identifying restrictions. In section 3 we describe our data, our empirical strategy,
and our ﬁndings.
2 The Model
The purpose of the model is to derive the structural restrictions that will allow us to identify the
diﬀerent shocks that aﬀect the economy. Since these restrictions apply to the long run eﬀect of certain
s h o c k s ,w ee m p h a s i z eo n l yt h el o n gr u np r o p e r t i e so ft h em o d e l .H e r ew ep r e s e n tas i m p l ec a s ew i t h
no capital and ﬁxed labor supply. The general case is presented in the appendix. Throughout










3The negative eﬀect of technology on hours has been disputed by several authors. See for instance Christiano et
al (2003).
3subject to the budget constraint
¯ ct +¯ bt ≤ ¯ πt +¯ wt¯ nt +( 1+¯ rt)¯ bt−1.
Consumers receive real labor income ¯ wt¯ nt, the aggregate proﬁts of the ﬁrms ¯ πt and the interest
payments ¯ rt on their real bond holdings ¯ bt. The real bond is in zero net supply. The consumption











The only non-standard feature of this model is the presence of idiosyncratic shocks ωit which we
label composition shocks:
˜ cit = ωit × cit.
The consumption of cit physical units of good i delivers the same utility as the consumption of
ωitcit
ωjt units of good j. The processes ωit are exogenous4 and they are assumed to follow a process of




i is a constant drift, Φω
i (L) is a square summable
polynomial in the lag operator L and ηω
it is a white noise. We maintain that compositions shocks
are an essential to describe the change in the ﬁrm and sectorial composition of the economy. The





















We assume that the goods markets operate under perfect competition, that labor is the only factor
of production, and that returns to scale are constant5.
yit = zitnit





i is a constant drift, Φz
i(L) is a square summable polynomial in the lag operator L and ηz
it is
4We use the normalization
R 1
0 ωθ−1
it di =1 . The shocks are conveniently normalized to make ¯ p a price level (i.e., if
all prices are the same, they are also equal to the price level). The normalization is such that idiosyncratic shocks do
not directly aﬀect aggregate outcomes. Suppose that you compare two economies with diﬀerent distributions of ωit.
Also suppose that all industries have the same productivity and that the two distributions satisfy the normalization
condition. Then the two economies will have identical aggregate outcomes (same capital stock, same labor supply,
same interest rate).
5See appendix for the case with capital accumulation and endogenous labor supply.
4a white noise. Perfect competition implies that real proﬁts are zero and
pit






cit =¯ wt¯ nt
together with our deﬁnition of ¯ p,i m p l i e st h a t
¯ wt¯ nt =¯ ct,

































where ¯ zt is the aggregate productivity. From this last expression it is apparent that aggregate labor




it × ¯ z
1−θ
t ¯ nt.


























Finally, we assume that there is a transitory shock ηT
it. By [construction], this shock has no perma-


























5We discuss the role of capital and endogenous labor supply in the appendix.
3D a t a
We believe one important issue in our analysis is the choice of a productivity measure: we must
trade-oﬀ theoretical motivations against measurement error problems. Conceptually, Total Factor
Productivity (TFP) is the best measure. However measuring the eﬀective ﬂow of services from the
capital stock is extremely challenging. On the other hand, labor productivity (YH) is well measured,
especially in the long run, but it is aﬀected by non technological shocks. For instance, shocks to
the labor supply schedule (see appendix) would decrease hours in the short run and increase the
capital-labor ratio and labor productivity in the long run6. We take these issues very seriously, and
we check the robustness of our results to diﬀerent measures of productivity in the sectorial dataset.
We perform the analysis on two diﬀerent data sets. The ﬁrst one is a subset of COMPUSTAT
database that contains annual data for 526 ﬁrms7. The second one is the sectorial input-output
database developed by Dale W. Jorgenson et al. that covers 33 sectors at roughly the 2-digit SIC
level, including 21 manufacturing industries. The sample in the ﬁrst dataset runs from 1970 to 2003.
In the second dataset, the sample runs from 1958 to 1996. Because the ﬁrst data set, which we have
labeled FIRM, is at a more disaggregated level, it has the potential to more eﬀectively disentangle
technology shocks from composition shocks. On the other hand the second data set, which we label
SEC, contains a careful measure of TFP.
Our baseline speciﬁcation includes three variables: a productivity measure, the relative weight
of each ﬁrm and the labor input, which we denote respectively zi,m i, and ni. Our measure of
productivity8 is YH for the FIRM dataset and both TFP and YH for the SEC dataset. The relative
weight series is constructed dividing the quantity of output of each ﬁrm by the sum of the output
of all ﬁrms or sectors. Lastly the labor input is the number of employees in the FIRM data set and
the quantity of labor input in the SEC data set.
To determine the correct stationary transformation of the variables we run a battery of tests.
We perform an Advanced Dickey Fuller (ADF) unit root test for each series to assess the presence
of a stochastic trend in the series. The results for the FIRM data set are summarized in Table 1.
For example, in the case of the logarithm of labor productivity, we were able to reject the null of
a unit root at the 10, 5 and 1 percent conﬁdence levels for respectively 47, 38 and 8 ﬁrms. The
ADF test on the ﬁrst diﬀerence of the same series rejected the null of the unit root at the 10, 5
6Uhlig (2004) points that changes in taxes on capital income can also aﬀect the long run labor productivity. See
Gali and Rabanal (2004) for a discussion.
7The 526 ﬁrms cover the 33 sectors of the Jorgenson dataset. These are all the ﬁrms with non-missing values for
the variables of interests between 1970 and 2003.
8The precise construction of every variable is decribed in the data appendix.
6and 1 percent conﬁdence levels for 499, 489 and 414 ﬁrms, respectively. Similarly, performing a
Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) test, we were not able to reject the null of stationarity
for the same series at the 10, 5 and 1 percent conﬁdence for 132, 69 and 50 ﬁrms, respectively. The
KPSS test on the ﬁrst diﬀerence did not reject the null of stationarity at the 10, 5 and 1 percent
conﬁdence for respectively 517, 488 and 467 ﬁrms. A summary of the results suggests that the large
m a j o r i t yo ft h es e r i e si sI ( 1 ) .
4R e s u l t s
Our baseline speciﬁcation is the trivariate VAR with two lags9 estimated for each ﬁrm or sector i.
To remain consistent with the outcome of the previous tests we specify the VAR in ﬁrst diﬀerences.
The joint behavior of the three variables is described by the following MA representation where the




























it are structural shocks, which are assumed to be mutually orthogonal and serially
uncorrelated with variance normalized to unity10. The MA is recovered estimating a VAR11 and
using the long run restrictions derived in the stylized model of the previous section: the composition
shock, ηω
it has no long run eﬀect on the productivity which restrict ci12(1) to be 0 and the transitory
shock ηT
it h a sn ol o n gr u ne ﬀect on both the productivity and the relative weight of the ﬁrms which
restrict ci13(1) and ci23(1) to be both equal to 0.
4.1 Impulse Responses
We discuss the results obtained with the FIRM data set, only highlighting the results for the SEC
dataset if they diﬀer. In our speciﬁcation the three variables have a stochastic trend, therefore no
shock has a transitory eﬀect on the level of a variable unless we have imposed it.
Permanent technology shock.
Figure 1 shows the estimated eﬀects of a positive permanent technology shock ηz
it. The left part
of the ﬁgure displays the graph of the mean impulse response of the level of the three variables
to a one standard deviation of the shock. The right part shows the corresponding distribution of
9The results estimating the VAR with 1 or 3 lags are very similar.
10Both the orthogonality and normalization of the structural shocks are part of the identifying assumptions. The
normalization assumption just redeﬁnes the unit of each shock. The orthogonality assumption is justiﬁed on the basis
that we are identifying fundamental shocks.
11We are implicitely assuming that the MA is fundamental, see Lippi and Reichlin (1993) for a discussion of this
assumption.
7impact and Long Run responses for the ﬁrms. The mean of the point estimates suggests that a
positive technology shock increases both productivity and the relative weight but decreases hours.
The decline in hours is consistent with the evidence from aggregate and industry data reviewed
in Gali and Rabanal (2004). The distribution of responses shows that the impact and the long
run eﬀect on productivity is positive for all ﬁrms. The eﬀect on the weight is positive on impact
and in the long run for 81% and 70% of the ﬁrms, respectively. Firms that experience a positive
productivity shock becomes more important in the sector. The eﬀect on hours is negative on impact
and in the long run for 78 percent and 81 percent of the ﬁrms, respectively.
Previously, we have argued that TFP is conceptually a better measure than labor productivity
for what concerns our identiﬁcation. We chose to present the labor productivity results because the
TFP series for the FIRM data is unavailable. This is due to the lack of a reliable measure of the
capital stock. The concern with TFP is potential long run measurement error due to the diﬃculty
of measuring capital services and quality changes in factors input12. The advantage of the SEC data
set is that the authors have produced series of factor inputs that account for almost any known
measurement problem. The results for the technology shock identiﬁed using the SEC dataset are
virtually identical13 t oo n eo b t a i n e dw i t ht h eF I R Md a t a s e tb o t hi nt h es p e c i ﬁcation with YH and
with TFP.
Composition shock.
Similarly Figure 2 shows the estimated eﬀects of a positive composition shock ηω
it.T h ei m p a c t
eﬀect on productivity is equally divided between positive and negative across ﬁrms while its long
run eﬀect is constrained to zero. The impact and long run eﬀects on the weight are positive for all
the ﬁrms. The impact and long run eﬀects on hours are positive for virtually all ﬁrms: a ﬁrm whose
weight increases in the long run without an increase in productivity, increases its labor input.
Transitory shock.
Finally Figure 3 shows the estimated eﬀects of a positive transitory shock ηT
it.T h ei m p a c te ﬀect
on productivity is negative for 60 percent of the ﬁrms, while its long run eﬀect is constrained to
zero. The eﬀect of the transitory on productivity at high frequencies is not surprising given its strong
eﬀect on labor input. Using the SEC dataset the impact eﬀect of the transitory shocks becomes
positive for 67% and 68% of the sectors using the YH and the TFP measure, respectively14.T h e
12We are not concerned by the short run measurement error of TFP, due to many reasons such as variable intensity
of input utilization.
13The identiﬁed technology shock has a negative eﬀect on the labor input in both speciﬁcations. Figures of the IRF
using the SEC dataset ara available online at URL.
14This consistent with the observation that labor productivity and hours are positively correlated at the sector
level, but not at the ﬁrm level.
8impact eﬀect on the weight is positive for roughly half of the ﬁrms while, its long run eﬀect is again
constrained to zero. Here, the short run eﬀect is also small. The impact and long run eﬀects on
the level of hours are positive for 100% and 81% of the ﬁrms, respectively. The large heterogeneity
across ﬁrms is not surprising, and is perhaps expected. Overall the mean impulse responses look
plausible.
4.2 Variance Decompositions
4.2.1 Firm and Industry Dynamics
Figure 4 shows the mean of the variance decomposition for the variables in level of each N estimated
VAR. From the ﬁgure it appears that productivity movements at the ﬁrms level are on average
overwhelmingly explained by technology shocks. On impact approximately 80% of productivity
movements are caused by technology shocks while composition shocks and transitory shocks explain
12% and 8%, respectively. Relative weights movements are dominated by composition (on average
62% of impact movements and 70% of Long Run movements) and technology shocks (roughly 30%
at all frequencies). Labor input movements are also dominated by composition (on average 53% on
impact and 55% in the long run) and technology shocks (on average 34%). Perhaps not surprisingly
we ﬁnd that the transitory shock is not so important for ﬁrms dynamics. Figure 5-6 show that the
mean variance decomposition across sectors of the diﬀerent shocks are similar for the technology
and composition shocks, while the transitory shock explains around 45% of the labor input variance
using the YH and the TFP measures. As we shall see below, this last observation reﬂects the fact
that sectors are already aggregate units.
4.2.2 Aggregate Dynamics
We now turn to the principal motivation of the paper and investigate the co-movement of the three
shocks across ﬁrms. For each ﬁrms shock, we compute all pair-wise correlations with the same shock
of all other ﬁr m s .T h i sg i v e su st h r e es y m m e t r i cN × N matrices of correlations. We then take the
average15 for each ﬁr m sa n de n du pw i t hN mean correlations16. Table 2 shows that for our baseline
speciﬁcation the average of the mean correlations is around 2.6 percent for the technology shock,
2.43 percent for the preference shock and 23.6 percent for the transitory shock. Table 2 also reports
the percentage of pair-wise correlations that are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero for each shock. For
instance, 85 and 91 percent of the pair-wise correlations between the ηz
it are not diﬀerent from zero
a tt h e1 0a n d5p e r c e n tc o n ﬁdence level. These numbers are not very diﬀerent for the ηω
it pair-wise
correlations. On the contrary for the ηT
it the percentage of insigniﬁcant correlations drop to 6.5 and
15In taking the averages we exclude the 1 on the main diagonal of the correlation matrix.
16Using the median instead of the mean gives similar results.
910 percent.







N for j = z,ω,T in order
to visualize the implications of the correlations for an aggregate shock. One has to keep in mind
that these are structural shocks whose variance is normalized to one, and that ﬁrms have diﬀerent
weights, so that the average shock of Figure 7 has no meaning beyond making explicit the diﬀerent
levels of correlation between the shocks. The transitory shock appears as a good candidate to explain
aggregate short run ﬂuctuations, which are characterized by a high degree of co-movement across
ﬁrms. Indeed the average of the transitory shock appears to experience more important ﬂuctuations
than the technology shock. On the contrary, permanent technology and composition shocks appear
to be idiosyncratic, or relatively uncorrelated, and appear to be poor candidates to explain aggregate




the aggregate transitory shock is potentially a good candidate17. Interestingly Figure 7 shows that
the aggregate technology shock exhibits a sustained negative period during the mid 1970’s beginning
of 1980’s18, and a sustained positive period in the 1990’s, while the aggregate composition shock is
dominated by a large positive shock in 1980.
From the average variance decomposition we conclude that the transitory shock is the least
important shock at the ﬁrm level. However, contrary to the technology and the composition shock,
the transitory shock appears to hit many ﬁrms contemporaneously. This property implies that at the
aggregate level the transitory shock is able to explain almost the entire short run ﬂuctuations of the
economy. To illustrate this, we use the estimated VARs to simulate a series for each ﬁrm shutting
down the eﬀect of the technology shock and the composition shock19. Figure 8 shows the actual
aggregate output and hours series together with the actual series. The transitory shock explains a
remarkable large proportion of the ﬂuctuations of both aggregate output and hours. To compute an
exact variance decomposition of aggregate hours and output is impossible. This is because transitory
shocks of ﬁrms are typically correlated with technology and/or composition shocks of other ﬁrms.
We would have to make an assumption on causality (a technology shock in ﬁrms j increases demand
and therefore causes a positive transitory shock in ﬁrms j0 or vice-versa) to be able to order the
shocks. The correlation across ﬁrms of diﬀerent shocks is an avenue to pursue but beyond the scope
of this paper. Figure 9 shows the simulated series shutting down the eﬀect of the transitory shock
and the composition shock.
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.0003939
yeart R2 =0 .1812. The number below
the coeﬃcients are standard errors. year is a time trend. The transitory shocks appear to be the main eplanatory
shocks of the recessions. Positive permanent technology shocks are also negatively correlated with recessions while
positive permanent composition shocks are positively correlated with recessions.
18This is consistent with the productivity slow down experienced by the US economy.
19In the appendix we illustrate the exact procedure.
10The main result we take from this exercise is that shocks that cause aggregate ﬂuctuations do
not imply large ﬂuctuations in productivity, relative demand and labor input relative to permanent
shocks. However, they do happen to hit a large fraction of ﬁrms contemporaneously.
Table 2 shows that the sectorial technology shocks have their average correlation that increases
up to 9.6% percent. This is still much lower than an average of 24.8 percent for the transitory shock.
Excluding the technology and composition shocks, the simulated series is qualitatively similar to the
one obtained in the ﬁrst data set .
5 Towards an interpretation of the shocks
Thus far, we have restrained from interpreting the diﬀerent shocks. We now try to make some
progress on this crucial issue. We ﬁrst compare the shocks identiﬁed from sectorial data to the
shocks identiﬁed from ﬁrm data.
Table 3 contains sector-level regressions. Table 3a shows that permanent technology shocks from
SEC are signiﬁcantly related to both permanent technology and transitory FIRM shocks. SEC
composition shocks are related to all three FIRM shocks. Transitory SEC shocks are mostly related
to transitory FIRM shocks. The ﬁrst ﬁnding is potentially the most troublesome, and suggests that
aggregation problems are important. The results are similar if we use TFP in the SEC regressions.
T oi n v e s t i g a t ef u r t h e r ,w er e g r e s st h eS E Ca n dF I R Ms h o c k so nt w ow e l lk n o w n ,i d e n t i ﬁed shocks:
the Romer-Romer monetary shocks, and the Hamilton oil price shocks. Table 3b presents the results.
The top coeﬀcient in the technology columns is a red ﬂag for the SEC permanent technology shocks.
These shocks are caused by monetary shocks, which as theory tells, us should be transitory. The
bias seems less severe when we use TFP, but it is still present. By contrast, the ﬁrst column shows
that the FIRM permanent technology shocks are not caused by the Romer shocks. As expected,
oil price shocks have both transitory and permanent eﬀects, and monetary shocks have a signiﬁcant
transitory eﬀect. We conclude that SEC shocks suﬀer from aggregation problems, and we focus on
FIRM shocks in the rest of the analysis.
Table 4 shows the results of ﬁrm level regressions. Lagged oil shocks are always very signiﬁcant:
an increase in the oil price20 has negative transitory and permanent negative consequences. Monetary
shocks do not have a permanent eﬀect, but a transitory one: a contractionary monetary policy
induces a negative transitory shock. Next, we introduce ﬁscal variables, using cyclically-adjusted
data from CBO, which should capture true changes in ﬁscal policy, as opposed to automatic feed-
20The Hamilton (1996) shock is deﬁned as the amount by which the log of oil prices ot in quarter t, pt, exceed the
maximum value over the previous four quarters and 0 otherwise:
max{0,o t − max{ot−1,o t−2,o t−3,o t−4}}.
11backs from shocks to GDP. We ﬁnd that spending and taxes have positive and negative transitory
eﬀects, as expected. We also ﬁnd that both spending and taxes tend to have negative permanent
eﬀects. To ascertain the validity of these interesting ﬁndings, we ran some robustness checks. The
negative permanent eﬀects of government spending appear robust across sub-samples, while the
negative permanent eﬀects of taxes disappear if we focus on the post 1985 subsample, and include
more ﬁrms. That taxes decrease long run labor productivity can easily be explained if taxes reduce
returns on capital, and therefore investment. Likewise, if government spending crowds out private
investment through higher interest rates, one would expect lower labor productivity. These results
show that permanent productivity shocks need not come from exogenous changes in technology.
This seems a natural topic for future research.
Finally, we also introduce consumer conﬁdence. However, one must keep in mind that unlike the
monetary, ﬁscal and oil shocks that we have discussed so far, this one is not a structural shock. We
ﬁnd that consumer conﬁdence is strongly related to the transitory shocks, but also somewhat related
to the permanent shocks, although with a much smaller magnitude. We believe that this exercise
conﬁrms the validity of our approach. Using ﬁrm level data is a clear improvement. The shocks that
theory tells us should not aﬀect long run productivity, do not, and those that should, do. On the
other hand, we acknowledge that a good part of the transitory component remains unexplained.
6C o n c l u s i o n
We have found that permanent productivity shocks and permanent changes in the composition of
output explain at least 4
5of ﬁrms’ dynamics. On the other hand, shocks that are transitory but
correlated across ﬁrms are responsible for the bulk of aggregate volatility. We have shown that
transitory shocks are signiﬁcantly related to monetary policy, while permanent shocks are not. We
have found that oil shocks have both permanent and transitory eﬀects. Finally, we have documented
that the expansionary eﬀects of ﬁscal policy appear in the transitory components, but also that both
spending and taxes seem to have negative long run eﬀects.
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14AA p p e n d i x
A.1 Long run restrictions with a general production function
We now consider general production functions with constant return to scale, and a standard labor








Value added of ﬁrms i is given by
yi = fi (ki,n i)




















This in turn implies that in the long run, the only factors aﬀecting labor productivity are the tech-
nology of the ﬁrms, and w
r+δ. In particular, composition shocks ωi do not aﬀect labor productivity






















And the price must be equal to the marginal cost21
pi
¯ p
= χi (r + δ,w)








i (r + δ,w)
National income identity (in real terms) is
¯ y = w¯ n + r¯ k (1)





















¯ y =¯ c + δ¯ k (2)
Given our deﬁnition of the price level, we have that
Z µ
ωi
χi (r + δ,w)
¶θ−1
=1 (3)
















Finally, a labor supply function guaranteeing balanced growth is





We have 5 equations (1,2,3,4,5) in 5 aggregate unknowns
¡





















Permanent shock to ω have no eﬀect on TFP by construction, and no eﬀect on labor productivity









Using TFP, our identiﬁcation system should pick up technology and composition shocks exactly.
Using labor productivity, we would classify as technological shocks that increase w
r+δ,i np a r t i c u l a r
shocks that move the labor supply schedule (5). This may be an issue for interpreting the technology
shocks in some speciﬁcations.





























. We know from Walras that it is in fact redundant.
16A.2 Data Construction
Here we report how to construct the variables used in the analysis using the original data of the two
data sets.
FIRM: The labor productivity is zit =
salesit
newpoit
hit where sales stands for value added, newpo for
the sector output deﬂator from the Jorgenson dataset that we extend to 2002 and h for the number





. The labor input nit is simply equal to hit.
SEC: We construct a value added series to make the labor productivity comparable across the
t w od a t as e t s :vaddit = vqit−vmit−veit where vq is the value of output, vm and ve are respectively
the value of materials and the value of energy used in production. The labor productivity is then





where poit the output deﬂator, vlit is the value of the labor input and plit
is the deﬂator of labor input. TFP in the SEC data set is directly computed as a growth rate:
∆lnTFP it = ∆lnQit − skit∆lnKit − slit∆lnNit − seit∆lnEit − smit∆lnMit
where Qit is real output,Kit,N it,E it and Mit are the quantity of capital, labor energy and
materials used in production and skit = vkit
vqit,sl it = vlit
vqit,se t = veit
vqit and smt = vmit
vqit are the nominal
share of output that goes to the diﬀerent inputs. The real weights are simply mit =
Qit PN
i Qit and
labor input is the original variable contained in the data set.
A.3 Simulations and Aggregation
Here we report how to obtain the aggregate series for output and hours that are implied by the
transitory shocks ηT






Which we can rewrite












B e c a u s ew er u nt h eV A Ri nl o g s ,w ec a ns i m u l a t eu s ing the estimated parameters and structural
shock each ∆lnnit for all the ﬁrms. Of course by construction each ∆lnnit is equal to the original
one. We deﬁne ∆ln ˜ nit the series simulated shutting down the productivity and composition shock
. The simulated aggregate hours implied by the transitory shocks are:










¯ nt−1 . Following similar steps we simulate the aggregate output implied by the
transitory shocks:






i,t−1 × exp(∆ln ˜ nit + ∆ln ˜ zit)
!










Mean Response to Technology Shock
years
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Distribution of LR Effects










































Figure 1: Firm Dymanics due to the Technology shock.T h eﬁrst column shows the average of the
ﬁrms’ impulse response. The second and third column show respectively the distribution of impact
and Long Run responses. FIRM dataset, Data source: COMPUSTAT.





Mean Response to Technology Shock
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Figure 2: Firm Dymanics due to the Technology shock.T h eﬁrst column shows the average of the
ﬁrms’ impulse response. The second and third column show respectively the distribution of impact
and Long Run responses. FIRM dataset, Data source: COMPUSTAT.






Mean Response to Composition Shock
years
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Figure 3: Firms Dynamics due to the Composition shock.T h eﬁrst column shows the average of the
ﬁrms’ impulse response. The second and third column show respectively the distribution of impact
and Long Run responses. FIRM dataset. Data source: COMPUSTAT.
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Figure 4: F i r m sD y n a m i c sd u et ot h eT r a n s i t o r ys h o c k .T h eﬁrst column shows the average of the
ﬁrms’ impulse response. The second and third column show respectively the distribution of impact
and Long Run responses. FIRM dataset. Data source: COMPUSTAT.

















































Figure 5: Firms Dynamics, Variance Decomposition. Each panel shows the mean of the variance
decomposition for the variables in level of each N estimated VAR. The ﬁrst panel shows the per-
centage of the variance of zi, mi and ni explained on average by the technology shock while the
second and the third respectively for the composition and the transitory shock. Firm dataset. Data
source: COMPUSTAT.














































Figure 6: Industry Dynamics, Variance Decomposition. Each panel shows the mean of the variance
decomposition for the variables in level of each N estimated VAR. The ﬁrst panel shows the per-
centage of the variance of zi, mi and ni explained on average by the technology shock while the
second and the third respectively for the composition and the transitory shock. SEC dataset using
YH. Data source: Jorgenson.

















































Figure 7: Industry Dynamics, Variance Decomposition. Each panel shows the mean of the variance
decomposition for the variables in level of each N estimated VAR. The ﬁrst panel shows the per-
centage of the variance of zi, mi and ni explained on average by the technology shock while the
second and the third respectively for the composition and the transitory shock. SEC dataset using
TFP. Data source: Jorgenson.












Figure 8: Aggregate Dynamics.Average of ﬁrm level shocks. Data source: COMPUSTAT.




















Figure 9: Aggregate Dynamics. Aggregate simulated growth rate of hours and output implied by
the transitory shock versus the actual series. FIRM dataset. Data source: COMPUSTAT.




















Figure 10: Aggregate Dynamics. Aggregate simulated growth rate of hours and output implied by
the technology shock versus the actual series. FIRM dataset. Data source: COMPUSTAT.





1% 8 414 12 285 14 351
5% 38 489 39 408 35 442
10% 47 499 58 450 55 484
KPSS
1% 50 467 24 397 19 424
5% 69 488 34 448 41 466
10% 132 517 84 507 102 506
Table 1: Number of ﬁrms for which the null hypothesis of a unit root could be rejected using the
ADF test and the null of stationarity could not be rejected using the KPSS test. The total number
of ﬁrms is 526. All the series are entered in logarithms and ∆ indicates the ﬁrst diﬀerence operator.




h 0.026 0.0243 0.2360
*0.8513,** 0.913,***0.973 * 0.8280,** 0.8937,***0.963 *0.0656,** 0.1071,***0.229
SEC
y
h 0.0957 0.0307 0.248
*0.8008,** 0.878,***0.9452 * 0.7422,** 0.8262,***0.918 *0.5273,** 0.623,***0.7988
SEC TFP 0.0476 0.0227 0.2763
*0.8237,**0.8916,***0.9725 *0.7759,**0.8512,***0.9725 *0.4968,** 0.5739,*** 0.7833
Table 2: For each speciﬁcation the ﬁrst line reports the average of the mean correlations of the three
identiﬁed shocks across Firms/Sector and the second line the percentage of pairwise correlations non
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent form zero. * indicates a 10 percent and ** a 5 percent level of signiﬁcativity.
25Technology Composition Transitory Technology Composition Transitory
0.146 0.178 -0.148 0.475 0.094 -0.017
0.085 0.078 0.079 0.083 0.081 0.078
0.014 0.72 0.034 0.263 0.592 0.195
0.089 0.082 0.083 0.088 0.086 0.083
0.143 0.206 0.657 0.16 0.129 0.61
0.065 0.06 0.061 0.064 0.062 0.06
N 744 744 744 744 744 744
Technology Transitory Technology Transitory Technology Transitory
0.137 -0.967 -1.941 -2.541 -1.257 -2.086
0.283 0.323 0.64 0.597 0.655 0.593
0.135 -0.373 1.072 -0.158 0.352 -0.288
0.308 0.35 0.696 0.649 0.712 0.644
-0.753 -1.479 -4.502 -1.802 -2.142 0.548
0.462 0.527 1.046 0.975 1.07 0.968
-2.43 -7.77 -2.608 -10.002 -3.932 -10.09
0.462 0.526 1.045 0.974 1.069 0.967
N 744 744 744 744 744 744
Table 3: Shocks identified from Sector versus Firm level data
Notes: Standard Errors are in intalics, under the regression coefficients. Sample period is 1970-1996 (because Romer-
Romer shocks are not available in recent years). Sectoral Data from Jorgenson, Firm Level Data from Compustat.










of Firm Level 
Shocks
Shocks from Sector Data & TFP
3b: Explaining Transitory & Technology Shocks
Shocks Identified from Sector Data & TFP
3a: Regression of Sector-Shocks on Firm-Shocks. Dependent Variable is Shock Identified from Sector Level Data




26(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
-0.401 -0.227 -0.218 -1.994 0.089 0.175
0.247 0.192 0.188 0.253 0.186 0.185
-2.044 -0.895 -0.833 -8.714 -2.336 -4.414

















N 10489 12483 12483 10489 12483 12483
Technology Shock Transitory Shock
Hamilton Oil Shock
Hamilton (lagged)
Table 4: Explaining Firm Level Shocks
Notes: All regressions include Firm Fixed Effects and a Linear Time Trend. Government Spending and Taxes are cyclically adjusted by CBO. Standard erros are in italics below the
regression coefficients.
Growth Rate of Public
Spending, cyclically
adjusted
Growth Rate of Public
Spending (lagged)
Growth Rate of Taxes,
cyclically adjusted
Growth Rate of Taxes,
cyclically adjusted,
(lagged)
Romer-Romer Shock
Romer-Romer (lagged)
Consumer Confidence
Consumer Confidence
(lagged)
27